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"DE-JEOPARDIZING JUSTICE":
DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
AND THE NEED FOR TRANSNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
Brent Wible°
INTRODUCTION
How should we feel about prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, Habre in Senegal,
or Sharon in Belgium? Ambivalent. Even those who look most favorably on
international criminal law and its potentially positive impact on human rights
suffer conflicting responses to universal jurisdiction. The idea that some acts are
so terrible as to compel international attention and an international solution
satisfies our sense of justice. At the same time, something seems amiss when a
defendant stands trial in country X for acts committed thousands of miles away.
Victims in the home country often resent that their history is put on trial abroad,'
and citizens of prosecuting states question why they should meddle in another
country's affairs.
These tensions subject national prosecutions for international crimes to great
scrutiny, opening the proceedings' legitimacy to question. The fact that these
national proceedings are often idiosyncratic raises even more questions. Many
international crimes are inadequately defined, leaving domestic courts leeway to
fill in details, and it is rarely clear which procedural rules apply. Which
punishments apply-those pertaining in the trial state or those of the state where
the crime was committed-also remains a contested issue.
Universal jurisdiction will never be perfect; neither will people ever feel
completely at ease with a borderless system of international criminal law. The
sense of inequity resulting from courts in the north sitting in judgment on leaders
from the south is most likely insurmountable in a world of asymmetrical power.
2
* J.D., Yale Law School 2003. Bernstein Fellow in International Human Rights, 2003-2004. I would
like to thank Professor Michael Reisman for his helpful comments and academic supervision.
1. For example, after Pinochet was indicted in Spain, Chile experienced a resurgence in
nationalism as a response to perceived recolonization. See Anthony Faiola, Spanish Firms Revive Latin
America Conquest, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2000, at AI; Sinikka Tarvainen, Straw Releases Spain from
Tight Straits, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 2, 2000.
2. Whatever one may think of this imbalance as a political or moral matter, the relative quality of
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The potential for states to use universal jurisdiction prosecutions as a political tool
of interstate conflict will remain. 3 Likewise, those who believe that "trials from
without" miss the point, by speaking to the wrong audience and failing to respond
sensitively to a country's political reality, will never be content with universal
jurisdiction.4
Despite these endemic concerns, work can be done! insofar as prosecutions
under universal jurisdiction suffer from a lack of authoritative legitimacy and
integrity as a legal matter. International mechanisms need to be put into place so
that its exercise will be firmly grounded in international process. Domestic courts
should incorporate as much international law, including both substantive and
procedural standards, as possible into prosecutions for international crimes. They
must engage in a structured international judicial dialogue along both vertical and
horizontal dimensions to insure the development of consistent practices. While
universal jurisdiction will never be perfect, it will be substantially better if
informed by well-developed international standards.
Some scholars suggest that since few states are willing to prosecute non-
nationals for atrocities committed abroad, a universal jurisdiction subject to
prudential concerns will over-deter prosecutions under international law., If it
appears legitimate and has integrity, however, states may be more likely to
exercise universal jurisdiction. As a stepjoward this goal, it is important to narrow
the gap between the theoretical application of universal norms and the variation
across jurisdictions that exists in practice. National prosecutions for international
crimes will have greater integrity and legitimacy, and the authority of international
criminal law will benefit from transnational convergence. The resultant growth of
international norms should increase accountability for terrible acts, deter the kind
of atrocities that marked the twentieth century, and contribute to a greater degree
of human dignity.
Part I of this article explores the difficulties that arise from application of
universal norms in domestic courts without a harmonizing structure. Part II argues
that the informal mechanisms that could influence exercise of universal jurisdiction
and deter the most divergent practices are ineffective. Part III examines some of
the costs of universal jurisdiction. The article concludes by suggesting some
approaches for structuring an international criminal system that would allow
domestic courts to play a central role without divesting universal norms of their
courts and judges in, for example, Spain as opposed to the Sudan suggests that there may be reason to
prefer this "sense of inequity" to the alternative. See Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an
Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under International Law, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv.
399, 417 (2001). States that have the power to use universal jurisdiction generally have the most
independent judiciaries that ensure due process and respect the rule of law. Lack of abuse to date,
however, may only be a reflection of the fact that universal jurisdiction is only nascent. Madeline H.
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 337,
354 & 357 (2001).
3. Morris, supra note 2, at 356.
4. See Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
5. Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 241,256 (2001).
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international character.
I. The Peculiar Difficulties of Prosecuting International Crimes in Domestic
Courts
Many international crimes are loosely defined. Even where a convention has
been adopted, as in the case of genocide and torture, many of the details are left to
national jurisdictions.6 The applicable procedural rules are not mentioned in these
instruments, and the non-hierarchical assembly of international tribunals and
national courts applying this body of law reach different conclusions operating
under different procedures. 7  While some divergence among the jurisdictions
prosecuting these crimes is inevitable, is it desirable that states be allowed to
define procedures, and in large part, the crimes themselves? Is such proliferation
pathologic in a system based on international norms? The difficulty arriving at a
particularized set of rules in international criminal law became clear during the
Treaty of Rome negotiations.8
This section seeks to determine some limitations on the divergence of
substantive prohibitions and procedural rules across jurisdictions. In the extreme,
different procedural rules and judicial interpretations of definitions could so stretch
the substance of the law as to raise the ex post facto issue. Precision in criminal
prohibitions, like retroactivity, is a window onto the fairness and integrity of
international criminal proceedings. National divergence must be adequately
constrained so that prosecutions do not amount to and are not perceived as
"victors' justice."
Some scholars hint that the lack of precision in international criminal law was
6. The Genocide Convention broadly defines genocide as any of several enumerated acts
committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group."
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, September 12, 1948, art. 2. The
burden of proof, defenses, evidentiary and procedural rules, and applicable penalties are left entirely to
the states parties. Id. at art. 5. The Convention Against Torture likewise enumerates acts amounting to
torture, but Article 4 leaves it to the contracting parties to "ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, December 10, 1984, art. 4. Thus, even in the documents where international criminal
law is most clearly expressed, all but the most general elements of the crimes are to be defined by
national legislatures. See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court:
An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 717 (1996) (arguing that the main problem with international
crimes is their lack of precision and the failure of international instruments to mention penalties, mens
rea, or defenses).
7. Wexler, supra note 6, at 717-718.
8. Some have criticized the ICC Statute for deliberately leaving the definitions of crimes to
national legislatures, a gap that could lead to prosecutorial abuse and make any ICC prosecution the
equivalent of a common law crime. See Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court:
Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 158-59 (2001); Wexler, supra
note 7, at 717. (arguing that one of the most serious criticisms of international criminal justice is the
absence of a well-defined body of international criminal law); International Law Association, Report of
the Thirty-Fourth Conference (1927) 179-80 (comments of Dr. Emil de Nagy, M.P. (Hungary)
(questioning whether an international criminal code should precede the institution of an international
criminal court or whether the ICC should function as a common law court).
2002
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consciously intended to deter a whole category of behavior rather than encouraging
actors to legalistically tailor their actions in compliance with the law.9 Regardless,
the argument does not go to the question of procedural protections and the
divergence of procedural rules that might lead to substantively different crimes
across jurisdictions.
A. Specificity in International Criminal Law: Analogy to the Common Law
Scholars argue that international criminal law cannot be precise.'0 Rather, it
develops necessarily like the common law, gradually applying the principles of
previous decisions to new situations."
The expectations of specificity in international criminal law cannot, however, be
the same as in national criminal legislation.... International law, like common
law, develops gradually on the basis of states' practices, conventions, and other
manifestations of customary law, which in some cases also include "general
principles of law."12
Analogizing international criminal law to the common law poses a number of
problems. The specificity question cannot be swept away by analogizing to a
highly contested category-the common law crime. Nonetheless, the analogy to
the common law raises interesting issues relating to precision that are unique to
international law.
Since international criminal law develops largely through conventions, which
tend to lack specificity, and cases, as the recent history of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 13 and International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) 14 indicate, does the non-hierarchical structure of
courts considering international criminal law pose any difficulties? Given a range
of prior decisions from different courts and tribunals, is it easy for a court to
disregard, distinguish, or rely only on cases it wants to?' 5 The notion of stare
decisis has historically been foreign to international law.' 6 In the traditional
9. M. CherifBassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Needfor a Specialized Convention, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457,473 (1994).
10. Id. at 470-471.
11. Id. at 470.
12. Id. at 470.
13. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 202 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1996).
14. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex, available at
http://www.ictr.orglwwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocsstatute.html (last visited October 25, 2002).
15. The International Court of Justice [hereinafter "ICJ"], confronts divergent rulings in some
areas of its work, and its current president has expressed the need to impose harmonization. Gilbert
Guillaume, Speech by his Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of
Justice, to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (October 2000), at
http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/ipresscom/ (last visited October 25, 2002).
16. Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute indicates that although ICJ decisions are not binding
precedent, the ICJ may use past decisions when determining current disputes. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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positivist framework, there could be no binding precedent because parties had to
submit to an international court's jurisdiction to hear a particular case. 7 While the
positivist understanding of international law is no longer as dominant as it once
was, international criminal law presents some novel problems in terms of
precedent.
With so many criminal tribunals, separated by space, time, and historical
context, precedent poses greater difficulties than at the ICJ, which has institutional
continuity at least. The potential for divergence increases when domestic courts
try defendants under universal jurisdiction. Limited attempts to impose hierarchy
on the international criminal system have been made. For example, the ICTY and
the ICTR share a common appeals chamber and theoretically apply consistent
law.18 Moreover, the ad hoc tribunal in Sierra Leone is required to follow ICTY
and ICTR precedent.' 9 There will be no common appeals chamber, however, and
no formal mechanism to ensure consistency.20
Harmonization could be imposed with common law crimes in a hierarchical
judicial system, but no such overarching authority exists in international law. The
provisions to encourage uniformity among the ad hoc tribunals will not effect
domestic prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. With domestic courts, the
informal mechanism of judicial globalization2' is the only thing akin to precedent
that currently encourages harmonization of international criminal procedure and
interpretations of the substantive law. At least one scholar considers the trend
toward harmonization of procedural and evidentiary rules to be robust.22 Leaving
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 103 cmt. b (1987) (noting the
"traditional view that there is no stare decisis in international law," but that decisions of international
tribunals adjudicating questions of international law are persuasive evidence of what the law is).
17. Alfred P. Rubin & Alison L. Forbes, Ethics and Authority in International Law, 22 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 335 (1998).
18. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 24, S.C. Res. 935, available at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited October 25, 2002); Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 25, S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1411 (2002) available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited October 25,
2002).
19. Article 20(3) of the Statute of the Special Court directs the judges of the Special Court's
Appeals Chamber to be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 20(3) (2002), available at http://sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.htm. Article 14(1) of the Statute adopts the Rwanda Tribunal's rules of
procedure and evidence "mutatis mutandis." Id. at art. 14(1).
20. The U.N. Secretary General explicitly rejected a proposal to share the common Appeals
Chamber for the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals with the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Report
of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (2000) (rejecting ajoint appeals chamber as "legally unsound and practically not feasible"),
available at http://www.daccess-ods.un.org/docUNDOC/GEN/NOO/661//77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?
OpenElement (last visited October 25, 2002).
21. The term describes the phenomenon whereby judges from different jurisdictions cite and
follow each others' reasoning.
22. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM.J.INT'L. L. 462, 463 (1998) (stating
that "the rules of procedure and evidence each Tribunal has adopted now form the vital core of an
international code of criminal procedure and evidence that will doubtless have an important impact on
the rules of the future international criminal court"). Others find evidence of increasing harmonization
2002
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aside the question of whether or not a convention creating a system of binding
precedents is politically feasible, such a system would remain unenforceable in the
absence of a supranational adjudicative body with appellate criminal jurisdiction.
B. Dealing with Imprecision: Fair Trial Standards and Judicial Integrity
International law recognizes a number of fair trial standards.23 These
standards set a baseline of procedural fairness without confronting the subtler
questions of the specificity of international criminal law or the distinct nature of
prosecutions under it. Some scholars insist that international prosecutions require
a different set of governing principles than criminal proceedings in a municipal
setting. 24  Between these two poles-guaranteeing defendants certain rights in
every trial and recognizing the peculiarities of international criminal
prosecutions-the clarity and details of the crimes at issue keep slipping through
the cracks. 25 This important issue must be more fully explored. Five guidelines
are proposed below to introduce harmonization into domestic enforcement of
international criminal law and to encourage an international criminal system with
integrity.
First, a mechanism is required to ensure that domestic statutes that expand on
customary international law are not applied retroactively. While the war crimes
acts of most states are under-inclusive, failing to implement all of the Geneva
Conventions and their protocols, the statutes in some states go beyond the
26parameters of those instruments. The question is not simply whether the
at the supranational level, largely resulting from the regional human rights systems. Diane Marie
Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75
IND. L.J. 809, 810 (2000).
23. These fair trial standards have been expressed in Article 14 the ICCPR, the ICC Statute, the
Geneva Conventions, and a number of other international covenants. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL 342 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1993); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, art. 67-68, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998); Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 99-108, 6
U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 134.
24. While in absentia trials are unthinkable domestically, the rationales for that position may not
hold in the international context. Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments
on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 268-69 (1994). Likewise, while
anonymous witness testimony in domestic prosecutions would violate the defendant's right to a fair
trial, such testimony may be appropriate in international trials, both because witnesses have more to fear
and because protection measures would be ineffectual. Arguing that the reasonable doubt burden is
designed to ensure that erroneous judgments will more often set guilty defendants free than send
innocent ones to prison, and judging that the social disutility of acquitting a guilty genocidaire is much
greater than of convicting an innocent defendant on false charges of genocide, some find that, in human
rights lawsuits, the prosecutor's burden of persuasion should be considerably less. Developments in the
Law--International Criminal Law, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1989 (2001) [hereinafter Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal
Defense].
25. Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 24, at 1991.
26. For example, the Belgian statute takes the notion of war crimes beyond the traditional grave
breaches of the 1949 conventions. See Jacques Verhaegen et al., Commentaire de la loi du 16juin 1993
relative a la repression des infractions graves au droit international humanitaire, REVUE DE DROIT
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development is positive.27 Rather, the question is whether the particular domestic
institution has an international mandate to make innovations in international
criminal law. Domestic courts should refrain from judicial lawmaking in the
international criminal context. In the absence of an appellate court that could
harmonize divergent national decisions, that work is better left to international
tribunals, whose decisions will form part of the universal precedent upon which
domestic jurisdictions can draw.28 International tribunals take into account a
broader horizon of perspectives than would a domestic court, and their
jurisprudence has the advantage of being informed by a non-parochial set of
considerations. The International Court of Justice has adopted a similar position,
approving the prioritization of international tribunals over domestic exercise of
universal jurisdiction.29
Second, statutes of limitations should not apply for serious abuses of human
rights. ° In most jurisdictions, statutory limitations do not exist for murder and
PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 1114-1184 (1994); The Belgian statute extends the notion of war crimes
beyond international conflict to civil wars and allows for individual criminal liability for acts that were
"forbidden" but not explicitly criminal under the Geneva Conventions' common article 3. E. David, La
loi beige sur les crimes de guerre, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 668-684 (1995/2). The
ICTR and the ICTY later found acts falling under that article to be prosecutable violations of customary
international law.
27. Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 272-73 (arguing that "grave breaches" should be interpreted to
include all the prohibited acts of common article 3, thus allowing universal jurisdiction, because these
acts are just as profoundly disturbing as others that are prosecutable under international law).
28. National courts must be able to make some innovations, since the international community has
proved willing in only limited circumstances to create ad hoc tribunals. M.O. Chibundu, Making
Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
1069, 1148 (1999) ("if the international community of jurists is to create an enduring jurisprudence of
international human rights law, it will be because those norms conver e from adjudications in multiple
jurisdictions each reflecting the socio-political structures of its constitution, while seeking to conform
local practices to evolving international standards."). Without a structured international judicial
dialogue or authoritative hierarchy that can impose harmonization, however, domestic innovations may
permanently unsettle the content of international criminal law and render prosecutions under it open to
doubt.
29. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium) 441 I.L.M. 536 (2002) [hereinafter "Congo v. Belgium"] (holding that, while heads of state
are immune from prosecution in domestic courts, those same officials may be prosecuted at an
international criminal tribunal having jurisdiction).
30. Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principal 6, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES], states that "[sitatutes of limitations or other forms of prescription shall not apply to serious
crimes under international law .. " In 1968, the United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statute of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity was drafted, and in 1974, the
Council of Europe concluded a corresponding convention. Adopted by Resolution 2391 (XXIII) of the
United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 26, 1968, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 68 (1969);
European Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and
War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974). Relatively few states,
however, have signed and ratified these conventions. Even if the states' motivations for not ratifying
these instruments does not affect the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes, the
nonapplicability of statutory limitations does not emerge as a generally accepted principle of
international criminal law.
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other serious crimes.31 Such limitations should likewise not apply to acts that
violate international criminal law. 2 Although prosecutions often take place long
after the fact, increasing the risk that international fair trial rights will be violated
and raising issues about the availability of witnesses and evidence, among other
things, 33 these problems do not warrant the conclusion that prosecutions for acts
that took place many years ago are per se unfair. Determining whether a fair trial
is possible should remain the task of the prosecutor and the judge.34 In a well-
functioning domestic judiciary, there is no reason to believe that courts are unable
to perform this task. Domestic prosecutions under universal jurisdiction need not
apply statutes of limitations in order to protect the integrity of their judicial
proceedings.
Third, a threshold of similarity across jurisdictions as to the definition of
crimes and the mens rea required for conviction would be a positive
development.35 Although genocide has been little prosecuted, its legal contours
were settled after the ratification of the Genocide Convention of 1948.36 The
concept of crimes against humanity, on the other hand, has developed primarily
through custom and adjudication, and its elements are consequently less certain.37
31. See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Christine Van
den Wyngaert, et al eds., 1993).
32. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.
T.S. 155, art. 2. As long as the non-application of statutory limitations applies only to acts that were
considered criminal at the time committed, there is no retroactivity concern here. The Council of
Europe Convention was designed to overcome this hurdle by stipulating that it would only be applicable
to offences committed after its entry into force. Id. This rule, however, seems over-inclusive. It is not
clear why acts committed before its entry into force that were clearly criminal when committed should
be subject to a statute of limitations since there is no foreseeability issue in this context.
33. See A.T. Richardson, War Crimes Act 1991, MOD. L. REv. 73,74 (1992).
34. Leila Sadat Wexler, The French Experience, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 284 (2d ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 1999).
35. Uncertainty as to the definitions of some international crimes remains. The most blatant
example is the "crime of aggression" in the ICC statute. Even more settled crimes, however, have
proved to be elastic. The Rome Statute's drafters intended, through the language of Article 10, to
encourage states to modify the Statute's definitions through domestic legislation. The framers foresaw
states adding to the list of protected groups under the Genocide Convention and expanding the
definition of crimes against humanity. Sadat, supra note 5, at 256-57. While these drafters seem to
have supported states' conflicting views of the content of international law out of something like
federalism concerns, this position is controversial. As states feel increasingly empowered to prosecute
under universal jurisdiction, if a prosecuting state applies idiosyncratic interpretations of international
law, that prosecution could violate the due process requirements of the criminal law and undermine
international criminal law in general. Morris, supra note 2, at 352.
36. The Genocide Convention requires the intentional destruction of a "national, ethnic, racial or
religious group." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, September 12,
1948, art. 2. Recent cases have challenged this definition in an effort to include systematic attacks on
political or cultural groups. William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification--Were the
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 287 (2001); Harvard Law
Review, Defining Protected Groups under the Genocide Convention, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2007 (2001).
37. These crimes were defined differently in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, in art. 5 of the ICTY
Statute, and art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. See CONST. OF THE INT'L MIL. TRIB. Art. 6(c) [hereinafter
"IMT"]; see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 1411,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002) available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm
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When international criminal law is enforced at the domestic level, a more rigorous
definition is required than in an international tribunal. Due to their international
character and particular historical contexts, the various international tribunals have
operated with differing definitions without great harm. In the absence of a strict
definition, however,_national courts and prosecutors have interpreted international
prohibitions in peculiar ways, undermining the notion that international criminal
law is a coherent body of universal norms. 38  For domestic prosecutions of
international crimes, it is important that a clear, internationally accepted definition
of those crimes be applied. Domestic prosecutions are not the proper fora for
judicial innovation. The innovation will likely be questioned by the international
community and the integrity of the proceedings thrown into question.
Fourth, it is not self-evident which source of law should designate the
punishment to be applied. The punishment could be provided by the trial state's
law, the law of the state where the crime was committed, the law of the victim's
home state, or the court could choose to apply the least severe penalty. According
to the ICTY Statute, the Yugoslav Tribunal should follow the practice of the
former Yugoslavia regarding sentences.3 9  The rule was established to avoid
retroactive sentencing in violation of the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege.40 Ultimately, because Yugoslavia had imposed the death penalty, the ICTY
decided that it would review the legal practices of the former Yugoslavia but
(last visited October 25, 2002); see Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res.
935, available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited October
25, 2002).; see Bassiouni, supra note 9 (arguing that, because of this ambiguity, crimes against
humanity should be codified in an international treaty); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The
New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381,427 (2000) (examining the
definitions); see also Beth von Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787, 792 (1999) ("Since its inception, the definition of
crimes against humanity has been plagued by incoherence."); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether
Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307
(2000).
38. Wexler, supra note 6, at 710. Finding that a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group was not
targeted as a group for eradication, but rather a number of political opponents from different countries,
the French courts did not find Pinochet's acts to amount to genocide. Brigitte Stem, French Tribunal
de Grande Instance (Paris), 93 AM.J.INT'L. L. 696, 697-98 (1999). By contrast,_Spanish courts found
that the definition of genocide under international law was inadequate and failed to capture the concept.
Thus, the genocide charges for persecution of political opponents-stood. Morris, supra note 2, at 353.
In the French prosecution of Klaus Barbie for crimes against humanity, the Court of Cassation added an
element to the crime. The Court found that the perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have
carried out his crime on behalf of a "state practicing a hegemonic political ideology." This definition
remains unique to France, and the decision, which strikes at the universal nature of international
criminal law, undermines the integrity of national prosecutions of international crimes. See Wexler,
supra note 34, at 284.
39. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of S.C. Res. 808, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 4 8 d Sess., 3 1 75 h mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) Rule 101.
40. The Tribunal encountered difficulties, however, because the former Yugoslavia allowed for
the death penalty but not life imprisonment, while the ICTY may impose life imprisonment but not the
death penalty. See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights
Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461,462(1997).
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would not be bound by them.4' If determining the source of punishments to be
applied by international tribunals is a delicate matter, the stakes are even higher
with national prosecutions. If trial states apply their own punishment, they
encourage forum-shopping, since those interested in prosecuting the crime would
seek the most favorable forum. From the standpoint of safeguarding the integrity
of the proceedings, it would be best to discourage a system where a defendant
could face the death penalty in one jurisdiction and life imprisonment in another.
Such divergence would seem arbitrary and undermine the notion of universality.42
As for applying the punishment of the state where the crime occurred, forum-
shopping would not be an issue. Although adequate Nnotice would exist and
sentencing would seem less arbitrary, this regime would present substantial
enforcement problems. European states would be reticent to apply another state's
death penalty in a universal jurisdiction case. The third proposition, that the
punishment of the victim's home state be applied, also might require imposition of
the death penalty. The punishment could raise ex post facto and notice issues as
well.
Although problematic, the "least severe penalty" rule-judging between the
trial state's law and the law of the state where the crime occurred-surpasses the
others.43 While it avoids both the notice and enforcement issues, it introduces
others. The Rwandan Tribunal confronted its difficulties." Those in leadership
positions who devised and organized genocide have escaped capital punishment,
while lower-ranking perpetrators appearing before Rwandan courts have been
subjected to the death sentence.4 5 This problem of "vertical inequity" is a serious
political and theoretical issue. In most cases of widespread violence, however, the
state's judiciary would be in disrepair and the state would be unwilling or unable to
carry out prosecutions at all, making the issue purely theoretical. Even where the
41. Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment (Nov. 29, 1996), at http://www.un.org/icty/
erdemovic/trialc/judgment/erd-tsj961129e.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002). Many of the cases before
the Human Rights Committee under Art. 15 of the ICCPR have concerned the retroactive imposition of
punishments, i.e., punishments that are more severe than those on the books when the crime was
committed. The ICTY approach comports with the standard enunciated in that instrument.
42. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965). A comparison to federal systems is useful.
While allowing states to develop and apply their own procedural rules for state crimes is inherent to the
federal system of government, so is giving federal courts and legislatures exclusive power over the
substantive and procedural laws relating to federal crimes.
43. Essentially, this rule would be a choice of law provision. The U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested that the purpose of the Erie doctrine is to avoid "forum shopping" and the "inequitable
administration of the laws." Id. at 460. At the international level, that purpose is best achieved by the
least severe penalty rule. As an example, the European Court of Justice, concerned by the divergent
application of EU law in national courts, requires that a national court's application of procedural rules
to an EU cause of action may not vitiate the substantive right nor render it impossible to exercise in
practice. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 214-15
(Oxford University Press Inc. 1998).
44. Rwandans party to the debates preceding the establishment of the ICTR expressed concern
that the Statute "establishes a disparity in sentences since it rules out capital punishment, which is
nevertheless provided for in the Rwandese penal code." U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 16 (1994).
45. Id.
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problem exists concretely, the "least severe penalty" rule is arguably justified if it
increases the integrity of prosecutions under international criminal law, has a
deterrent effect, and results in a general shift away from capital punishment in
domestic courts.
The subtext is that no significant group of states would approve an
international tribunal today with the power to impose capital punishment.46 Thus,
it would be odd for a national prosecution of an international crime to result in the
death penalty. On a case-by-case basis, the "extradition impact" may resolve this
problem, with many states refusing to comply with extradition requests from states
that plan to seek the death penalty.47 This informal regime is not perfect, however,
and it will not lend national prosecutions the same integrity as the "least severe
penalty" rule. States should reach an international agreement governing the
imposition of sentences in universal jurisdiction cases.
Finally, the accused require adequate procedural protections. While it has
been noted that the particular circumstances surrounding international criminal
trials militate against having the same procedural protections that municipal
criminal trials require,48 certain fundamental procedural protections like probative
standards, the burden of proof, and available defenses must not be compromised.4 9
Also, peculiar double jeopardy problems arise from national prosecutions under
international law, and efforts must be made to protect defendants from unfairness
through multiple domestic prosecutions.5" As for amnesties and immunities,
domestic courts prosecuting under universal jurisdiction have no authority to grant
them. 5' Considerable international consensus indicates that amnesties for serious
abuses of human rights are improper. 52 A foreign court-distanced from the social
46. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, Principle 10, states that a state may refuse to
entertain a request for extradition based on universal jurisdiction if the person sought is likely to face
the death penalty, to be subject to torture, or if international due process norms are likely to be violated.
Stephen Macedo, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principal 10, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited October 25, 2002); See generally Ved P.
Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests-Capital Punishment and Torture, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1369 (2000).
47. The United States has entered into several bilateral treaties containing clauses assuring the
partner country that the death penalty will not be sought. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-
U.K., art. 4, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230; Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. 9, 35 U.S.T. 3023,
3031; U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989. See infra discussion
Section 11(a).
48. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(d); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
103 cmt. b (1987).
49. Anthony D'Amato, National Prosecution for International Crimes, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT (2d ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 1999).
50. Id.
51. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2543-44 (1991) (finding that amnesties for human rights abuses
are per se illegitimate); Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty
Commissions and the Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1999)
(arguing that amnesties are improper except in the context of a transition to democracy).
52. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, Principle 7, at 31 (stating that amnesties are
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
and political context of the state where the crimes occurred-especially has no
authority to grant amnesties or immunities, enforcement difficulties aside.53
The proliferation of jurisdictions available to prosecute international crimes
presents new and interesting problems in criminal procedure. 54  The Lotus
paradigm continues to dominate this area of international law. 55  Under that
doctrine, each sovereign may apply its own law in a case unless there is a rule
prohibiting it from doing so, and international law has not yet developed a system
of conflict of laws to resolve the problem.56 Hardly enough attention has been paid
to which body of procedural law the forum state should refer when exercising
universal jurisdiction. At Nuremberg and in the first days of the ad hoc tribunals,
procedural rules received scant attention.57 The international tribunals have their
own rules of procedure that, while largely judge made, at least resulted from
international debate, taking into consideration the needs of international criminal
law. 58 Domestically, many nations have passed laws enabling local prosecution of
criminals from the Yugoslav or Rwandan conflicts found in their territories.59 In
some cases, a difference in procedural rules between the domestic system and the
international tribunal would be outcome determinative. The question then arises,
which rule of procedure should apply? Deferring to the national rule could lead to
war crime forum-shopping from a prosecutorial standpoint, with the prosecutor at
the international tribunal relinquishing jurisdiction and victims bringing cases as
inconsistent with the duty to punish serious abuses of human rights); Study on Amnesty Laws and their
Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights, Prelim. Rept. By Louis Joinet, Special
Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 38h Session, Provisional Agenda Item 9(a),
at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16; General Comment No. 20(44) (art. 7), General Comment
Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, para. 4, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.3, Oct. 3, 1992; Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Case 4, Inter-Am. C .H.R. (Ser. C) (1988) (holding that states have a
duty to investigate and punish serious abuses of human rights) available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie-c_4_ing.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Orentlicher, supra
note 51, at 2543; Schabacker, supra note 51, at 53.
53. For serious abuses of human rights, courts' power is asymmetrical. Universal jurisdiction is
meant to ensure that the victims will have justice. Courts vested with universal jurisdiction, while
having the authority to prosecute, do not have the power to grant amnesties or immunities.
54. Domestic procedural regimes to enforce international criminal law vary considerably from
state to state. A number of aspects of criminal procedure, including statutes of limitations, immunities,
pardons, penalties, and the rights of the defendant are local in character. As of yet, there is scant
relationship between national and international proceedings and virtually no integration of procedural
rules. Sadat, supra note 5, at 257-58.
55. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Set. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
56. Sadat, supra note 5, at 257-58.
57. See, e.g., Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence:
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 729-30 (1999).
58. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 41-86 (1995) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/ct-rules7.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002); Cristian DeFrancia, Due
Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (2001).
59. Many states enacted laws to incorporate the obligations imposed by Security Council
Resolution 827 establishing the international tribunal in Yugoslavia to prosecute accused persons
discovered on their soil.
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parties civiles60 in jurisdictions with procedural rules more favorable to their case.
A possible solution is that the international tribunal's rule would override domestic
rules. To assure integrity, however, adopting the rule most favorable to the
defendant would be the best choice.6' Since no equivalent to the international
debate producing the tribunals' procedural rules exists at the domestic level,
adopting the rule most favorable to the defendant, judging between the rules of an
international tribunal and a domestic court, would cast the best light on national
prosecutions for international crimes.
Situations inevitably will arise where international law provides no rule on a
problem and municipal law must apply. Some scholars suggest that municipal
rules should be modified in consideration of the crime's international nature,
drawing on the principles of private international law to inform criminal
procedures.62 For the moment, however, when prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction are regarded with great skepticism, relying on even these modified
national procedures in international prosecutions will result in a loss of integrity
and will undermine their universality. Judged against the procedural rules arrived
at after painstaking international debate, whether those from Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
or the ICC, the rule most favorable to the defendant should be applied. While this
solution may not be exact, and international law still might not provide any clear
answers, it is imperative that international standards set the baseline against which
domestic prosecutions for international crimes are judged.
11. The "Invisible Hand" Encouraging Transnational Harmonization
The possibility for variation among the laws of jurisdictions hearing
international criminal cases is vast. Procedural rules and sentences proliferate, as
do interpretations of the definitions and elements of crimes. In the absence of a
formal unifying structure, are there informal "checks and balances" in the
international system that introduce, at best, an element of harmonization or, at
least, some standards militating against the most divergent practices? Four
informal mechanisms have the potential to serve this function. First, the rules on
extradition could influence the fairness of national prosecutions for international
60. As explained by Judge Claude Jorda:
According to French law, any private individual or group of individuals may trigger a
criminal prosecution by introducing a claim in court. This is referred to as "la
constitution de parties-civiles" ("the formation of civil parties"). If anyone "se constitue
partie-civile" against somebody else, the court must prosecute that individual.
See CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [CPP] art. 721 (Fr.). Claude Jorda, The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Its Functioning and Future Prospects, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
SYMP. 167, 202, n.53 (1999).
61. This rule would be consistent with the spirit of Article 15 of the ICCPR, which provides that a
heavier penalty may not be imposed if a lighter penalty was statutorily required at the time the act was
committed. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, art. 15. France
has adopted a similar rule for handling domestic prosecutions arising out of the Yugoslav conflict. See
Wexler, supra note 34, at 298 n. 157.
62. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 363-66 (1994).
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crimes. Second, the fact that prosecuting states must rely on other states'
cooperation to gather evidence introduces the possibility of some checks. Third,
the emergence of a transnational judicial dialogue whereby decisions in one
jurisdiction gain authority by drawing on precedents from international tribunals
and foreign courts is promising. Fourth, world opinion could substantially impact
these prosecutions, although it is not clear whether the world's gaze is more likely
to encourage fair prosecutions, deter exercise of universal jurisdiction altogether,
or turn prosecutors into celebrities. An examination of these issues will reveal
whether the central problems of domestic prosecutions of international crimes can
be addressed through informal checks currently present in the international system.
Put differently, this section analyzes the possible affects of a "free market" of
jurisdictions for international criminal prosecutions. Might this jurisdictional
competition lead to a convergence of definitions and procedural rules, greater
divergence, or no change at all?63 Others have argued that forum-shopping can
materially benefit human rights law, leading to both greater vindication of victim's
rights and a clearer exposition of the law.64 The multiplicity of fora might even
encourage horizontal dialogue among jurists in different jurisdictions to both
elucidate and harmonize the legal norms of international criminal law.65 For the
moment, these predictions remain aspirational. Rather than heralding the growth
of national prosecutions as unambiguously positive, this section will explore
whether there is an "invisible hand" encouraging harmonization for national
prosecutions under international criminal law.
A. The "Extradition Impact"
A custodial state receiving an extradition request for an indicted suspect is not
required to comply.66 If it finds that the proceedings in the requesting state would
be unfair or that the punishment would be overly severe, it can refuse to
extradite.67  While such dialogue could influence the fairness of criminal
proceedings, there is little indication that states scrutinize requesting states'
procedures.68 Extradition treaties, negotiated with law enforcement in mind,
63. Theodor Meron has argued that the evolving rules of procedure and evidence in the ad hoc
tribunals will coalesce into a well-defined body of rules of international criminal procedure. Meron,
supra note 22, at 463.
64. Laurence R. Heifer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 289-97
(1999) (arguing, in the context of treaty, regional, and international bodies, that forum-shopping
encourages development of human rights law that benefits victims and ensures adequate protections for
defendants)..
65. Id. at 293.
66. See Michael S. Topiel, The Doctrine of Non-Inquiry and the Preservation of Human Rights: Is
There Room for Reconciliation?, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 389, 406-8 (2001).
67. Id.
68. As a general rule, countries require only that the conduct is criminal in both the requesting and
sending states for an extradition to go forward. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition: The United States
Model, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 405 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). Little attention is
given to procedural details, and, under the rule of non-inquiry, the existence of an extradition treaty
with the U.S. prevents courts from reviewing whether or not the trial would be fair in the requesting
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provide a presumption that the extradition should go forward. In practice, refusals
to extradite are made largely by European states opposed to the death penalty.69
Thus, extradition has limited impact on the application of international criminal
law.70
The broad powers of enforcement jurisdiction in American law further
debilitate the extradition regime as a check on international criminal proceedings.
After Alvarez-Machain, American law enforcement officials may contemplate
kidnapping as an alternative to requesting extradition even from a state with which
the U.S. has an extradition treaty.7' While the cost in political capital may deter
extra-territorial enforcement in most cases, the Alvarez-Machain rule militates
against a robust extradition principle as an international check on the substantive,
procedural, and penal aspects of national prosecutions for international crimes.
72
The "extradition impact" as a tool for encouraging international dialogue in
national prosecutions for international crimes is further weakened because, in
many cases, extradition is not an issue. If the defendant arrives on the soil of the
country that then seeks prosecution, the potential for transnational checks and
balances through extradition is irrelevant.
Finally, as former dictators and human rights abusers learn the great lesson of
the twentieth century, to forego travel or to travel only to those states where they
are assured refuge, the likelihood of extradition decreases. 73  Extradition from
rogue states is unlikely. Even if extradition were granted, it is unlikely that such
states would provide checks on the fairness of criminal proceedings in the
requesting state. The prospect of human rights abusers receiving refuge in rogue
states also raises the likelihood of Alvarez-Machain solutions. The U.S. would be
most likely to resort to kidnapping in cases where extradition would be justified
but impossible for geopolitical reasons. In practice, this result could bear little
positive for the development of a robust system of checks and balances through
extradition rules.
country. Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989
(1971); see Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword
Mightier than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 213, 248 (2000). Of course, this rule depends on the
treaty's approval, where the procedural protections would presumably, though not necessarily, be
analyzed at the negotiation stage.
69. Generally, when the U.S. seeks to extradite a criminal from Europe, it undergoes formal
negotiations to assure that the criminal will not face the death penalty once extradited. Despite these
guarantees, European states remain ambivalent about extraditing to the U.S. In the wake of the events
of September 11, several European states have refused extradition. See Sam Dillon and Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2001, at Al. States also negotiate treaties stating that any suspect extradited to a requesting
state will not face the death penalty. See Topiel supra note 66, at 396-97.
70. Pinochet showed the world that extradition proceedings can be drawn out and political without
touching on the substantive legal issues. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 415.
71. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992).
72. Id at 666-67.
73. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 415.
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B. Mutual Legal Assistance
Because states prosecuting international crimes rely on mutual legal
assistance to gather evidence,74 officials in the country where the evidence is
located have a profound influence on the trial's shape. In this context, two
problems arise. First, evidence may be located in a state unwilling to cooperate
with the prosecuting state. That state may impede visits to sites and witnesses and
may prevent investigators from locating key documents. Second, where
investigators have access to documents, the court may have difficulty determining
their authenticity. Under the treaties governing mutual legal assistance, requested
states generally have broad discretion to refuse assistance on a number of
grounds.75
Experience at the ad hoc tribunals indicates that refusals to cooperate have
had a large practical impact on the proceedings.76 While refusal to grant mutual
legal assistance could perform a regulatory function on the proceedings in the
requesting state, its exercise depends largely on the character of the state that is
requested to cooperate. In many cases, a despotic regime will simply refuse to
cooperate whether or not the proceeding is just.77 The most likely result is a
rhetorical battle, where the prosecuting state seeks to discredit the requested state's
position. The proceedings' fairness will not be the focus in friction arising from
mutual legal assistance requests, and this form of extraterritorial influence is
unlikely to be a strong tool regulating national prosecutions for international
crimes.
C. Transjudicialism: The International Judicial Dialogue
The "international judicial dialogue," whereby domestic courts look to
international tribunals and foreign courts to inform their decisions, has aroused
scholarly interest.78 Some scholars see the ad hoc international tribunals, where
judges on one court often cite decisions from the other, as a harbinger of a more
wide-ranging judicial conversation about international criminal law. 79 To date,
however, this dialogue has primarily influenced the law of capital punishment,80
and a limited number of courts have opted to engage in the conversation." Not
74. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 412.
75. Id.
76. James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of International Criminal
Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 441 (2001).
77. Id. at 441.
78. Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law-The International Judicial Dialogue:
When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2049, 2049-50 (2001)
[hereinafter International Judicial Dialogue]; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104-05 (2000).
79. International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 78 at 2049-50.
80. Id.
81. In the death penalty context, the Canadian and Jamaican Supreme Courts considered the
European Court of Human Rights' decision in Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1989). See Kindler v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 779 (1991); Pratt v. Attorney-Gen. for Jam., 2 A.C. I (P.C.
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surprisingly, U.S. courts have been particularly unwilling to consider international
and foreign standards.
The possibilities for a fully international dialogue are narrow in the context of
national prosecutions for international crimes, given the rarity of such
prosecutions. Time will tell to what extent ICTY and ICTR precedents will impact
domestic decision-making. The fact remains that most states of the South, which
have been most receptive to judicial globalization, will not prosecute international
crimes in their national courts. These countries would face substantial costs in
terms of diplomatic and political capital, as well as the threat of informal economic
sanctions, if they exercised universal jurisdiction to try anyone but their own
former dictators.
This analysis suggests that the international judicial dialogue is a positive
development but a weak means of harmonizing criminal standards across
jurisdictions. Without a more formal mechanism encouraging transnational
judicial interdependence that engages the most prosecutorial states, there is little
evidence to suggest that the dialogue will prove to be robust. Some courts may
find it in their interest to invoke the decisions of international tribunals and foreign
jurisdictions as a means of legitimating their own rulings. Even courts sympathetic
to that rationale would be reticent to recognize a systematic dialogue contributing
to the development of a law that should, in order to maintain its integrity, retain its
essentially international characteristics when enforced in domestic courts. Thus, in
the absence of a more formal mechanism introducing a hierarchy of decision in
international criminal law, the international judicial dialogue will remain a weak
tool. It will not encourage the rigor and convergence that is needed if national
prosecutions for international crimes are to become fully legitimate in the eyes of
the international community.
D. World Opinion
Given the geopolitical context of national prosecutions for domestic crimes,
one might suppose that world opinion in general and the potential for costly
payouts of diplomatic capital 83 might encourage responsible prosecutions for
international crimes that fall closely in line with international standards of
fairness.84 While this may be true to some degree, the impact of world opinion will
most likely simply influence the number of prosecutions, leaving national
1993). The Indian Supreme Court considered foreign practice and scholarship in Bachan Singh v.
Punjab, 2 S.C.J. 475 (1980), as did the South African Constitutional Court in State v. Makwanyane,
1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) reprinted in 16 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 154 (1995).
82. See Goti, supra note 4.
83. See, e.g., The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 ICJ 3,
31.
84. NGOs could critically examine national prosecutions for international crimes. To date,
however, NGOs have tended to overlook the flaws in favor of developing a robust international
criminal system. See Amnesty International, News Release: Amnesty International Urges Investigation
of Ariel Sharon, Oct. 3, 2001, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/begium10032001.html (last
visited October 22, 2002).
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85procedural rules and interpretations of international criminal prohibitions intact.
Whether this international gaze will encourage too many prosecutions or deter
national prosecutions for international crimes altogether is the crux of the problem.
Whether there are too few or too many prosecutions depends on the legal rules
determining who may prosecute and be prosecuted.
In a national jurisdiction where all criminal prosecutions must be brought by
the sovereign, we expect few prosecutions for international crimes.86 Few
prosecutors will expend judicial resources to prosecute defendants for crimes
committed on foreign soil, and the world has seen few zealous prosecutors of
international crimes. Baltasar Garzon is the exception that proves the rule.
8 7
Garzon's actions have led to serious national debate in Spain about whether states
should become involved in such cases. 88 The exception aside, evidence indicates
that prosecutions by the sovereign will tend toward too few national prosecutions
for international crimes.
Civil law systems often allow alternative means of bringing criminal
prosecutions. These states allow "civil parties" to institute proceedings,89 where
the civil party acts as a private prosecutor to plead cases that the state may
otherwise overlook. While this system provides a forum for plaintiffs to bring
suits against human rights abusers, a state could pay a high political price for
divesting itself of the sole authority to choose which defendants may be criminally
prosecuted in its courts. 90  While the civil party mechanism will increase the
85. Professor Harold Koh's transnational legal process could be characterized as the force of
world opinion changing the trajectory of the law or inducing compliance among states. As his
examination of the Alvarez-Machain case and its aftermath indicates, however, the transnational legal
process often does not reach holistic solutions. The United States now prohibits transborder
kidnappings in Mexico but not as a general tool of law enforcement. While in a particular case, world
opinion may achieve its goals, its ability to change the law in a systematic manner is unlikely. Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,195-96 (1996).
86. David Scheffer, the former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, has noted that
governments are almost universally determined not to use universal jurisdiction. David Scheffer,
Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects, Opening Address Before the Universal
Jurisdiction Conference at the New England School of Law (Nov. 3, 2000), 35 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 233
(2001).
87. See Judge Garzon: Spain's Most Famous Investigator, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000 (examining
Judge Garzon's extraordinary political career as a prosecutor and the international notoriety that Garzon
gained from his role in the Pinochet affair) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/923083.stm
(last visited October 22, 2002).
88. See Tarvainen, supra note I (finding that Spain did not want to engage in intemational human
rights enforcement, but that "it was unexpectedly forced into that role when 'star judge' Baltasar
Garzon issued an arrest warrant against Pinochet in October 1998.").
89. See generally J.A. Jolowicz, Procedural Questions, 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. II, ch. 13, at 3-15 (Andrd Tunc ed., 1986) (examining the operation of the civil
party system in civil law countries); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to
American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?,
78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 613 (1990) (explaining the relationship between the French prosecutor's discretion
and the rights of victims who file criminal charges directly).
90. Under the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute, a number of criminal cases have been
instigated by civil parties against defendants like Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, Ariel Sharon, Yasser
Arafat, Pal Kagame, and Hissene Habre. The Sharon case has caused diplomatic stress, resulting in
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number of national prosecutions for international crimes, it might be so politically
problematic as to result in a rejection of such prosecutions altogether. 9'
No mechanism exists to encourage the optimal number of national
prosecutions. In the absence of a nexus between the prosecuting state and the
criminal, the victim, or the crime, such prosecutions will seem random, and no
clear standard for adjudicating cases has yet emerged that satisfies both human
rights and due process concerns. Perhaps the emergence of an international
criminal prosecution and defense bar, 92 as well as growth in the number of judges
with experience in the field, will help solve some of these problems. In the
meantime, it is unclear what steps may be taken to balance human rights concerns
with procedural fairness and perceived judicial integrity. The force of world
opinion is not a strong check on the procedural and fairness characteristics of
national prosecutions for international crimes. On the contrary, world opinion is
more likely to impact the number of such cases that are brought, and it is not a
strong element of the "invisible hand" that could regulate international
prosecutions.
E. Concluding Thoughts
Each of the informal mechanisms that could encourage transnational
convergence of international criminal substantive and procedural law is unlikely to
have much impact. A more formal means of harmonizing international criminal
law is necessary to ensure that universal jurisdiction is not altogether undermined
by idiosyncratic national prosecutions. The following section will highlight some
of the political costs that universal jurisdiction poses and discuss the impact of the
ICJ's recent decision in Congo v. Belgium-reviewing a prosecution under
Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute-on national prosecutions. The
concluding section will present some suggestions that should lend greater integrity
to international criminal prosecutions.
charges of Belgian anti-Semitism. See News Release: Amnesty International Urges Investigation of
Ariel Sharon, Oct. 3, 2001, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2001/belgium10032001/html (last
visited October 22, 2002); Exiles Seek Castro's Indictment in Belgium, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at
A32; Israeli Group to File Suit in Belgium against Arafat, Aug. 9, 2001, at
http://www.arabia.connews/article/englishl0,11827,61260,00.html (last visited October 22, 2002).
The political cost of opening its criminal system to private prosecutors has pushed some Belgians to
seek repeal of the universal jurisdiction statute. The Sharon case in particular has led the Belgian
parliament to consider amending its law, including temporary head of state immunity. Belgium's Legal
Trap for World Leaders, CNN.coM, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001WORLD/
europe/07/05/belgium.sharon (last visited October 22, 2002); Tyrants Fear Long Arm of Belgian Law,
SUNDAY TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2001 at http://www.is.lk/times/010805/specrpt.html (last visited October 22,
2002).
91. Morris, supra note 2, at 357 (arguing that the power to prosecute under universal jurisdiction,
when not adequately controlled by government actors mindful of international relations, could bring
about quite harmful results).
92. See Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, supra note 24, at 1992.
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Ill. Some Costs of Universal Jurisdiction
While this article has assumed that universal jurisdiction will occupy an
increasingly prevalent space in international decision-making, it has not considered
explicitly the costs inherent in decisions that will have political implications. The
article has generally suggested that one way to limit these costs is by harmonizing
the procedural and substantive norms of international criminal law to minimize the
possibility of aberrant decisions. This section seeks to point out more concretely
some of the costs of universal jurisdiction. If universal jurisdiction is to become a
productive addition to the toolbox of human rights and international politics, the
costs acknowledged here must be taken into account.
A. Discounting Diplomacy and Interstate Relations
It would be imprudent to discuss universal jurisdiction without considering its
potential use as a political tool of interstate conflict. 93 Every prosecution using
universal jurisdiction is certain to have an "irreducible element of controversy. 94
One need not conjure hypotheticals presupposing destructive intent to recognize
the potential havoc aggressive prosecution could wreak on international order.
Those who pursue prosecutions because they believe it is the just thing to do could
jeopardize political negotiations that might lead to less human suffering. Pundits
and scholars alike have opined that the former ICTY Chief Prosecutor's efforts to
indict Slobodan Milosevic made political negotiation impossible.95 Faced with the
threat of indictment, Milosevic opted to continue the fighting that led to many
more deaths.
96
While Milosevic's indictment may have been a poor exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, this example should not be offered to justify jettisoning universal
jurisdiction altogether. Although successful negotiations may reduce suffering
more than criminal prosecutions in some instances, we should not prematurely
limit non-violent solutions to international problems. What would be the
advantage in restricting the toolbox so that, if negotiations fail, military
engagement is the next best option? Other practical concerns reinforce the
argument that universal jurisdiction, combined with a strong dose of prosecutorial
discretion and institutional checks, should remain an option. First, negotiations are
often used as a stalling tactic.97 Negotiations can send the wrong signal to those on
93. As Madeline Morris notes, "states may exercise universal jurisdiction as a means of gaining
advantage over their opponents in interstate conflicts by prosecuting nationals of those opponent
states .. " Morris, supra note 2, at 354.
94. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 419.
95. See, e.g., Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our
Case Against NA TO and the Lessons to be Learned From It, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95, 95-7 (2001).
96. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 95, at 95-97; Mirko Klarin, Arbour's Pre-Emptive Strike, MOJO
WIRE, June 1, 1999, at http://www.motherjones.com/totalcoverage/kosovo/arbour.html (last visited
October 22, 2002).
97. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Address Before the
Human Rights Workshop, Yale Law School (March 1, 2002).
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the ground who may continue to participate in genocide, torture, or other inhumane
acts of violence. Without an affirmative signal-a condemnation that the acts are
contrary to law-violence may continue as negotiations proceed. 98 Moreover, the
history of American and international responses to genocide, widespread torture,
and war crimes indicates that negotiations will likely have little impact until after
the fact. 99 In many cases, there have been simply no negotiations at all until after
the damage was already done. Against this background, removing prosecution as
an option seems premature. Prosecutorial discretion and institutional checks are
not sufficient to minimize the costs of universal jurisdiction, however. Doctrines
like "head of state immunity" must be clearly conceived in order to avoid counter-
productive consequences arising from national prosecutions.
i. Head of State and Ministerial-Immunity
A number of doctrines, most importantly head of state immunity (a term
which this article will use loosely to cover other sovereign, ministerial
immunities), have historically been employed so that international political
processes are not subjected to proceedings in national courts. The doctrine is
rooted in the notion that one sovereign, of equal stature with all others, cannot sit
in judgment of another.100  Today, the strongest rationale for head of state
immunity is comity. Each state should respect the immunity of foreign heads of
states so that its leaders will be granted similar protection while abroad.' 0 '
The scope of head of state immunity, once absolute, has contracted over time,
and its contours have not yet settled. 0 2 In recent years, courts have carved an
exemption such that commercial transactions and other acts of a purely private
character are no longer covered by immunity.'0 3 Following this development,
courts have begun to recognize a distinction between a head of state's official and
unofficial conduct. 1 4  The distinction remains unclear, however, and this
jurisprudential ambiguity has been expanded by recent cases questioning whether
any act in violation of international law can ever be official.'0 5
The Pinochet case, in which the British Law Lords held that Augusto
Pinochet was not immune from prosecution as a former head of state for acts of
98. Power, supra note 97; see also Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001).
99. Power, supra note 97.
100. See Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 52 (1994).
101. See Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still
Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1051, 1061 (1995).
102. See Jarrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 169,179 (1986).
103. In Britain, for example, the State Immunity Act of 1978 curtailed the immunity of heads of
state with respect to proceedings dealing with private commercial transactions and torts. State
Immunity Act 1978, July 20, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1123.
104. Watts, supra note 100, at 55.
105. Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head
of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1588 (2000).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
torture committed under his authority, suggests that "official conduct" may not
include acts criminal under international law. 10 6 While that case is susceptible to
both broad and narrow readings, 10 7 its sister Chilean case' 08 and other international
developments' 9 suggest that head of state immunity is not absolute in the
international criminal context. 110 Professor Wedgwood sees a familiar distinction
in the division between official and unofficial acts."' Analogizing to the
difference between a soldier who kills in the course of combat and a soldier who
commits a war crime, she discerns the parameters of what actions may fall within
the "permissible portfolio" of a head of state, suggesting that acts violating
international law do not constitute official conduct."12
In the recent case between Belgium and the Congo before the International
Court of Justice, ' 3 the distinction between official and unofficial acts again came
to the fore. The Congo contested the legality of a warrant issued under the Belgian
universal jurisdiction statute in April 2000 against its incumbent Foreign
Minister.' 4 The DRC originally challenged Belgium's claim to jurisdiction, but in
its final pleadings before the court it dropped those arguments, focusing instead on
obtaining "a finding by the Court that it has been the victim of an internationally
wrongful act," the basis of which was the violation of the Foreign Minister's
sovereign immunity." 5 Belgium acquiesced in this tactical shift. Both countries, it
seemed, feared losing on the universal jurisdiction issue.
Addressing the head of state immunity issue, the Court's opinion employed
three primary analytical foci, distinguishing among incumbent ministers, former
ministers, and the special rules applying in international tribunals as opposed to
106. Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former
Heads of State Under International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193,203 (2000).
107. While a broad reading of the decision would classify acts criminal at international law as
unofficial acts for which immunity is not available, the decision could be narrowly interpreted to apply
only to the terms of the Torture Convention. Sison, supra note 105, at 1601; see also Ruth Wedgwood,
International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 841 (2000) (arguing that
"It]he reliance on the Torture Convention to parry official acts immunity narrows the reach of the
Pinochet opinion...").
108. In August of 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court seconded the Pinochet precedent by holding
that Pinochet's senatorial "immunity for life" did not protect him from prosecution for human rights
violations. Pinochet Loses Immunity in Chile Ruling, Reuters, Aug. 8, 2000.
109. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 844 (pointing out that the Rome Treaty expressly proscribes
official status as a head of state as a defense against criminal liability, but that the issue has not been
briefed to many signatory governments for fear that many would refuse to sign).
110. Lord Steyn, one of the Law Lords in Pinochet, left his imprint on this area of the law:
[S]ome acts of a Head of State may fall beyond even the most enlarged meaning of official acts
performed in the exercise of the functions of a Head of State .... The normative principles of
international law do not require that such high crimes should be classified as acts performed in the
exercise of the functions of a Head of State.
Ex parte Pinochet [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) (25 November 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 1337,
1338.
111. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 839.
112. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 841.
113. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29.
114. Id. at para. 1.
115. ld. at para. 42.
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national courts. 16 As for incumbent foreign ministers, the Court held that they
have absolute immunity from criminal, and by implication, civil suits while in
office."17 The Court offered a functional argument for disregarding any distinction
between acts taken in "official" capacity and in a "private" capacity." 8 Allowing
anything less than absolute immunity would deter ministers from traveling and
have other, negative chilling effects on the performance of their official
functions." 9 Making the point about absolute immunity perfectly clear, the court
noted that:
[i]t has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs,
where thee &are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
Under the Court's holding, former ministers benefit from a more limited
immunity.
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may
try a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts
committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect
of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.121
The decision is unclear as to the distinction between official and private acts,
or what can be classified as a "portfolio duty." The Court left open the possibility,
however, that national courts, provided that they have jurisdiction, could pursue
cases against former ministers for violations of international human rights law
committed during term of office.
In these rulings, the Court largely restated pre-existing jurisprudence. 122 The
Court made a new and important distinction, however, between national courts and
international criminal tribunals. Finding that an incumbent or former minister may
be subject to criminal proceedings before an international criminal court having
jurisdiction, 23 the Court noted that the exceptions to absolute immunity in those
international tribunals has no bearing on the existence of such an exception in
national courts. 
24
116. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 42.
117. Id. at para. 51.
118. Id. at para. 55.
119. Id. at para. 55.
120. Id. at para. 58.
121. Id. at para. 61.
122. Courts had frequently interpreted head of state immunity to be absolute with respect to
proceedings initiated in foreign courts and former heads of state to be immune for official acts
performed in the head of state's public capacity. See Watts, supra note 100, at 54; see also Re
Honecker, 80 I.L.R. 365 (F.R.G. Fed. Sup. Ct. (Second Criminal Chamber (1984))); Duke of Brunswick
v. King of Hanover, 2 H.L.C. 1 (1848).
123. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 61.
124. Id. at para. 58.
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Perhaps reflecting the functional concern that political negotiations should not
be threatened by national prosecutions and the belief that prosecutors in
international courts would be more sensitive to international political conditions,
the Court managed to state a strong limitation on the exercise of national universal
jurisdiction without directly addressing the issue. 125 At the very least, the Court
expressed concern that national courts may act opportunistically and that their
ability to prosecute ministers should be limited to prevent interference in
international political processes. 26 As noted, with regard to former ministers, the
decision does not differentiate between prosecutions in national courts and
international tribunals. 127 This facet of the decision comports with the functional
concerns outlined earlier-former heads of state no longer serve as "a
plenipotentiary of the state in its negotiations."'1
28
The ICJ opinion has immediate consequences. Its deference to international
tribunals effectively limits the use of judicial prosecutions of incumbent ministers
to those disputes where the international community has intervened to establish a
criminal tribunal. The decision could be read simply as defining different roles for
international tribunals and national courts in the context of international criminal
law by concentrating prosecutorial discretion in ongoing political conflicts while
permitting greater decentralization concerning former leaders.
While the decision seems formalistic and straightforward, it fails to crystallize
recent developments in the doctrine of head of state immunity. It overlooks
international instruments-not the customary international law that the Court
invoked-that arguably or explicitly forbid immunity for crimes under
international law. 129  To the extent that the judgment cuts against these
instruments, rather than interpreting them to apply only in international tribunals,
the Court has left an issue for future cases. Thus, the opinion may have injected
more confusion into the head of state immunity doctrine than is evident at first.
This lack of clarity, rather than limiting the costs of universal jurisdiction, may
well exacerbate them.
More immediately, Belgian courts have eagerly awaited the ICJ's decision in
125. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 58. The separate opinions discussed Belgium's
universal jurisdiction statute in detail. Nine of the justices would allow universal jurisdiction in some
form. President Guillaume expressed a strong distrust of national courts, however, positing that
international criminal courts have been developed in response to the deficiencies of national
proceedings. Id. (separate opinion of President Guillaume, at para 11). He found no justification for
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. Id. (separate opinion of President Guillaume, at para. 13).
Judge Koroma, by contrast, lamented the damage that this case may have done to national universal
jurisdiction. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Koroma at para. 5). He applauded Belgium's willingness to
prosecute international crimes and cautioned against interpreting the Judgment as a rejection of
universal jurisdiction. Id (separate opinion of Judge Koroma, at para. 6).
126. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 71.
127. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 29, at para. 59.
128. Wedgwood, supra note 107, at 841.
129. Id. (arguing that the Torture Convention was explicitly directed at officials and that it is
plausible to read the Convention to exclude immunity for sitting heads of state); see also, Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
art. 4 (allows for a head of state's criminal liability).
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order to determine how its universal jurisdiction statute will be received
internationally. The most notable of the ongoing universal jurisdiction cases in
Belgian courts is the prosecution of Ariel Sharon and co-defendants for their roles
in the incidents at Sabra and Shatilla. 130  The ICJ decision has obvious
consequences for the case against Sharon, an incumbent head of state. In a press
release issued shortly after the Congo decision, the private prosecutors in Sharon
expressed their intent to pursue their case against those defendants who have no
immunity and argued that the decision poses "no obstacle to the issuance of an
arrest warrant against Mr. Sharon as soon as he stops exercising his present
functions."1
3
'
The ICJ case left a number of questions unanswered. While Belgium's
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia provoked controversy, it is not clear
what further limitations the Court would seek to apply in a future case. 132 What is
the line between official and unofficial acts? How does the Court view universal
jurisdiction statutes? How would the Court treat national prosecutions of
incumbent ministers for torture and genocide, acts for which immunity may well
be prohibited? In the immediate aftermath of this case, the Belgian Foreign
Minister recognized that the law must be amended, but he insisted that "the basic
principles-the punishment of severe breaches of international humanitarian law-
remain applicable."' I3 3 Before the statute could be amended, however, Belgium's
highest court decided the Sharon case, holding that Sharon could face war crimes
charges in Belgium after he leaves office. 34 The Belgian high court thus adopted a
liberal interpretation of the ICJ's decision, respecting immunity for sitting heads of
state while finding that former heads of state can be prosecuted for certain acts
taken during their term of office.
135
Rather than backing away from its progressive approach to universal
130. See the Complaint against Ariel Sharon, BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, June 18, 2001, available
at httpJ/www.lawsociety.org/sharon/complaint.htm (last visited October 22, 2002).
131. Chibli Mallat, Luc Walleyn, and Michael Verhaeghe, Press Statement by the Lawyers
Representing the Victims of the Sabra and Shatilla Massacres, BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, Feb. 14,
2002. The prosecuting attorneys plan to make two arguments that the ICJ did not consider. First, the
decision only considered illegal the issuance of an international arrest warrant. In the Sharon case,
there is no warrant, only a criminal investigation. The Court's decision gave no indication that an
investigation alone is a violation of international law. Second, the warrant for Foreign Minister Yeroda
was not based on acts of genocide. The pleadings in the Sharon case, following the General
Assembly's characterization of the incidents at Sabra and Shatilla, allege genocide. The Genocide
Convention does not provide for immunity. Article IV states that "Persons committing genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." ICJ jurisprudence has confirmed the
universal character of the convention. BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, Belgian Appeals Court Agrees to
New Hearing, Re-Opening of Arguments, in War Crimes Case Against Ariel Sharon and Other Israelis
and Lebanese, Mar. 7, 2002.
132. Douglass Cassel, World Court and Jurisdiction, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Feb. 21,
2002.
133. Id.
134. Belgium Rules Sharon Can Be Tried, BBC.CoM, Feb. 12, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Il/hi/world/ middleeasti2754877.stm (last visited June 15, 2003).
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction in response to Congo v. Belgium, Belgium amended its universal
jurisdiction statute in April 2003, limiting its breadth while maintaining its
fundamental characteristics. Under the recent amendments, victims may file suits
directly only if they can establish a link between Belgium and the crime. The new
jurisdictional "nexus" requirement will be satisfied if the suspect is present in
Belgium, the crime occurred in Belgium, or the victim is Belgian or has lived in
Belgium for at least three years. 136  The amendments also authorize the
government to refer certain cases out of Belgium. 37 Finally, the amendments
harmonize the Belgian definitions of crimes with those in the ICC statute and
adopt the international law standard on sovereign immunity. 1
38
While the ICJ's ruling left a number of issues unresolved, it nevertheless has
served as a catalyst, causing Belgium to institute a set of legislative reforms that
should both minimize the costs of universal jurisdiction and serve as a model for
other states adopting universal jurisdiction statutes. The next significant challenge
to the Belgian statute may raise what is potentially the case's most consequential
effect-Belgium's explicit rejection of immunity for former ministers who
violated international human rights or humanitarian law while in office. No longer
permitting prosecutions of incumbent ministers in absentia, the amended statute
strikes a more appropriate balance between human rights concerns and minimizing
the costs of universal jurisdiction.
ii. The Special Challenge of Private Prosecutions
If extraterritoriality poses the danger of politicized prosecutions, one might
suppose that an independent prosecution, in addition to doctrines like head of state
immunity, would be an appropriate response. On the other hand, a prosecutorial
system that is not subject to adequate checks and the veto power of political actors
charged with foreign policy can lead to negative results. The risks of unrestrained
prosecutorial discretion are exacerbated in many civil law systems where private
parties can institute criminal proceedings. 3 9 When a state divests itself of the sole
authority to prosecute politically sensitive international cases, and where private
individuals who are not subject to adequate governmental control may institute
such cases, the consequences may be undesirable. The ICJ's recent decision may
well have been a response to the dangers of private prosecutors pursuing
international cases.
The typical response to such worries is faith in prosecutorial discretion. At
the international level, limited faith in prosecutors' judgment may be warranted. 140
136. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Questions and Answers on the "Anti-Atrocity" Law, June
2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/belgium-qna.pdf (last visited June 15, 2003).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. II Part 2, ed. Andre Tunc. The Spanish
legal system, for example, provides for an accion popular, whereby the victim of a crime may institute
a proceeding and pursue the case. Likewise, Belgian law allows for universal jurisdiction cases brought
by parties civiles. Id. See notes 68, 69 & text.
140. Former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour's indictment of Slobodan Milosevic suggests
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When prosecutors are part of the executive framework, their actions may be
adequately constrained by political actors so as not to upset political settlements
that would be more productive than a judicial proceeding. A similar review or
veto power is necessary to limit the potentially destructive consequences of private
prosecutions. States must develop standards to balance the competing interests.
Guidelines outlining the factors to be considered and requiring judicial review of
political discretion may be one response. 14 1 Just as universal jurisdiction is an
important tool in cases where negotiations are not forthcoming, are used as stalling
mechanisms, or simply send the wrong message to the combatants, private
prosecutions can also play an important role in international criminal law.
After the ICJ decision in Congo v. Belgium, the Belgian government amended
its universal jurisdiction statute to place a set of constraints on private prosecutors
requiring a "nexus" between Belgium and the alleged crime. 42 The amendments
also authorize courts to send certain pending cases to the accused's home state or
the state in which the accused is present if that state upholds fair trial rights and
actually pursues the case. 14 3 These amendments should minimize some of the
potential political risks that private prosecutors create, providing a check on
unrestrained prosecutorial discretion. If adequately constrained so as not to
jeopardize political solutions to international problems, private prosecutions may
serve an important function on the international level-prosecuting cases that
would otherwise receive little diplomatic or prosecutorial attention. With the rapid
development of universal jurisdiction, this subject deserves continuing
consideration. Creative solutions will be necessary to ensure that overly
aggressive private prosecutions do not lead to a rejection of universal jurisdiction
altogether.
B. "Bad States" and the Threat of Universal Jurisdiction
Advocates characterize universal jurisdiction as a tool with which those
responsible for heinous crimes can be prosecuted, deterring future mass crimes.
Exercise of universal jurisdiction has dangers, however, extending extraterritorial
adjudicative power to procedurally deficient and otherwise flawed judiciaries as
well as to those that respect the rule of law. 144
As universal jurisdiction becomes more common, some states may exercise it
as a political weapon. Of course, not all courts are equal. States refuse
extraditions to other states that are procedurally infirm, and a number of
that prosecutorial discretion may lead to adverse results. Evidence indicates that she indicted Milosevic
just when a political settlement was on the horizon, prolonging the conflict in the Balkans. See, e.g.,
Mirko Klarin, Arbour's Pre-Emptive Strike, MOJO WIRE, June 1, 1999, at
http://www.motherjones.com/total_coverage/kosovo/arbour.html (last visited October 22, 2002).
141. Broomhall, supra note 2, at 418.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. Morris, supra note 2, at 354 ("In evaluating universal jurisdiction, careful consideration must
be given to whether it is wise to augment the power and extraterritorial reach of all the judiciaries of the
world, and to do so in a category of cases particularly prone to politicization.").
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organizations dedicate their efforts toward exposing unjust judicial systems. Thus,
it is not clear that exercise of universal jurisdiction by a "bad state" will be taken
seriously. Moreover, a minor public relations campaign could discount the
seriousness of an international criminal trial undertaken in a country like Iraq or
North Korea. Nonetheless, universal jurisdiction could become a tool of interstate
conflict.
In the final analysis, the question must be posed whether universal
jurisdiction's benefits outweigh its costs. 145 The potential for interstate conflict
arising from prosecutions under universal jurisdiction could be minimized by an
emphasis on uniform international standards. For a verdict to be legitimate, the
procedural and substantive law applied would have to meet international standards.
One might argue that this approach would open all prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction to challenge in other national courts, undermining the authority of any
single proceeding. An international mechanism could militate against this
possibility. For example, an international body like the United Nations could
institute a certification process, differentiating judiciaries that have adequate
procedural protections to undertake prosecutions under universal jurisdiction from
those that do not. Implementing an appellate system might also dampen the
possibility for politically vexatious prosecutions.
If universal jurisdiction is to become a vital component of the international
legal and political landscape, the possibility of the "bad state" prosecuting
defendants under universal jurisdiction must be anticipated. The alternative is not
only that universal jurisdiction may lose integrity, but that it could actually lead to
international conflict. While this article has largely assumed that universal
jurisdiction will continue to be a fact of international life, it must be fashioned in a
way that acknowledges the risks and can manage the possibility that "bad states"
will seek to manipulate this jurisdictional mechanism for opportunistic reasons.
C. The Tension between the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction
While this article has assumed that the International Criminal Court and
universal jurisdiction could complement each other,146 the two may be in tension.
The complementarity provision in Article 1 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC
jurisdiction only when national courts prove unable or unwilling to prosecute.'47
Some scholars have suggested that national prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction could prevent cases from going before the ICC, divesting the new
court of jurisdiction.148
145. Morris, supra note 2, at 359.
146. See infra discussion in Conclusion (suggesting that the ICC's jurisdiction could be expanded
to include appellate review of national prosecutions for international crimes).
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
148. Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes within the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2001) (arguing that "the United States'
ability to prosecute is thus key to avoiding exercise of ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals or over other
cases where the Untied States has an interest ... ").
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Despite this tension, universal jurisdiction seems deeply consonant with the
aim of the ICC-achieving justice for international crimes. The ICC's limited
resources will be reserved for the most culpable offenders. Given that it will only
prosecute a small number of cases, universal jurisdiction will remain an
indispensable complement to it. Thus, it is not impossible to imagine an integrated
international system where national prosecutions will not be in conflict with
international courts. Rather, the ICC and national courts may engage in a
structured dialogue or even appellate review. In this fashion, national courts'
decisions would gain authority and have integrity. This optimistic vision will not
develop of its own accord, however. Measures will have to be taken to create the
institutional arrangements to ensure that the two do not develop at odds with each
other. The recent amendments to the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute take an
important first step in this direction. By harmonizing the Belgian definitions of
crimes with those in the ICC statute, the new law lays the groundwork for future
cooperation between national court exercise of universal jurisdiction and
prosecutions at the ICC. 
49
CONCLUSION
Universal jurisdiction remains a relatively novel basis for prosecution.
Nonetheless, the events of recent years indicate that national prosecutions for
international crimes will continue to increase. Vigorous prosecution in national
courts has the advantage over ad hoc tribunals of being a permanent mechanism
that can prosecute atrocities without great delay.' 50 Steps must be taken to ensure
that these proceedings have integrity and are carried out according to international
standards, however. If the peculiarities of national procedural rules and national
interpretations of international substantive law begin to disintegrate the
international characteristics of the crimes, the project as a whole could collapse.
Thus, transnational rules must introduce a measure of harmonization and
convergence across jurisdictions. This article concludes by proposing five
suggestions that may contribute to this harmonization and lend greater integrity to
national prosecutions for international crimes.
First, in the context of national prosecutions for international crimes, an
international treaty should provide for a formal judicial dialogue along the lines
developed in several African states. 15' The details of this dialogue, including the
weight to be accorded horizontal as opposed to vertical dialogues with
international criminal tribunals, will require careful attention. Instituting such a
formal conversation will ensure that national prosecutions do not diverge so much
as to delegitimize the project altogether.
Second, as a long-term program, the ICC's jurisdiction could be expanded to
149. Human Rights Watch, supra note 136.
150. Wexler, supra note 6, at 712.
151. See Andre Stemmet, The Influence of Recent Constitutional Developments in South Africa on
the Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 33 INT'L LAW. 47 (1999) (explaining
the new role for international law as a basis for judicial decision-making).
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include appellate jurisdiction over cases arising from national courts on
jurisdictional, procedural, and interpretive issues of prosecution under international
law. 52 The International Law Commission ultimately rejected this proposal in its
1994 draft statute for an international criminal court as too intrusive of state
sovereignty. 153 Nonetheless, having such a supranational appellate body to
harmonize interpretations of international criminal law while leaving to national
tribunals the function of deciding cases on the merits would both give domestic
prosecutions greater integrity and ensure that international criminal law develops
in coherent fashion.
Third, the international community could begin negotiations to create a body
of procedural rules for domestic prosecutions of international crimes. The rules
could be based on the body of procedural rules already tested and modified in the
ICTY and ICTR. 154  The uniformity introduced into national prosecutions for
international crimes by these rules will give them more legitimacy.
Fourth, a formal international agreement on the punishments, or at least the
method of determining the punishment to be applied, would be a timely and useful
effort. Much of the chafing against national prosecutions for international crimes
could be resolved simply by instituting an international regime of punishments for
international crimes.
Finally, prosecutorial discretion, especially the ability of civil parties to bring
suit, must be adequately bounded. The recent amendments to the Belgian
universal jurisdiction statute constitute an import effort in this direction. The
emergence of an international criminal prosecutorial and defense bar, as well as a
group of judges with experience trying such cases, also may mitigate this problem
by selecting the cases most favorable to the development of international criminal
152. Wexler, supra note 6, at 720 (arguing that an international criminal court could unify and
construct a coherent body of international criminal law); Ninth Report on the Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (1991), reprinted in
[19911 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 1) (Doudou Thiam,
Special Rapporteur) at 59 ("The court could also play a very important role in the unification of
international criminal law .... It could help to remove some uncertainties regarding terminology and
the definition of concepts, such as complicity and conspiracy and the attempt to commit such crimes,
whose content varies from one country to the next."); cf Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its forty-fourth session, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/47/10 (1992),
reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.I (Part 2) at 37
(concluding that the international criminal court should be a trial court rather than an appellate or
review body).
153. Report of the International Law Commission, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994) at 70.
154. Meron, supra note 22, at 463 (arguing that the rules used in the ICTY and the ICTR should be
useful in all prosecutions under international law); Wexler, supra note 36, at 363-66 (arguing that
procedural rules employed in international business law could be adapted to international criminal
prosecutions); E. M. Wise, I.L.A. Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court, Report on
General Rules of Law, December 27, 1996 draft, at 83 ("[T]here seems to be emerging broad agreement
that not only offense definitions and penalties, but also the general rules of liability and exoneration to
be applied by the court, cannot be left to national law, or otherwise permitted to vary from case to case,
but must be settled in advance.").
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law. 155 The development of judicial and attorney expertise will be necessary if
universal jurisdiction is to be practical. 56 Private party prosecutions must not be
allowed to undermine universal jurisdiction altogether.
While we may always feel ambiguous about prosecutions in domestic courts
for international crimes, especially for crimes committed in other parts of the
world, universal jurisdiction can be structured in order to provide considerable
international oversight. Because the crimes at issue are violations of universal
norms, it is essential that national prosecutions maintain an international character
and that there be formal mechanisms to prevent divergence from certain core
universal touchstones.
Harmonizing international criminal law will lead to a more coherent body of
law, will better protect defendants from deficient prosecutions, and will act as a
restraint on unjust exercise of extraterritoriality. If this body of law becomes more
developed through an integrated inter-jurisdictional system, local courts will have
the advantage of a strong set of international rules and precedents to draw on. This
project must pay careful attention to the costs inherent in universal jurisdiction.
Minimizing these costs is at least as important as expanding the power of national
courts to prosecute international crimes, and a balance must be struck between the
two. If done with requisite care, the development of a truly international and
integrated regime for enforcing international criminal law in domestic courts will
safeguard human rights, resulting in the greatest aggregate of justice and human
dignity.
155. Harvard Law Review, supra note 25, at 2002-03.
156. Expertise in national systems will mitigate the danger of peculiar interpretations of
international law in national courts. Wexler, supra note 6, at 710.
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